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Abstract: Human resource management (HRM) has paid insufficient attention to the impact of
context. In this article, we outline the need for HRM to take full account of context, particularly
national context, and to use both cultural theories and, particularly, institutional theories to do
that. We use research publications that utilize the Cranet data to show how that can be done.
From that evidence, we develop a series of proposals for further context-based research in HRM.
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INTRODUCTION
Human Resource Management (HRM) has paid insufficient attention to the impact of context.
There are clear reasons for that and also clear weaknesses that result from it. So we outline the
need for HRM to take proper account of context. Whilst conscious of the importance of what
we might call the organization’s proximate context (for example, its technology, its competi-
tive position, and its success) and of what we might call the intermediate levels of context
(such as size and sector), here we focus particularly on the more encompassing levels of
national context: the national context and international clusters within which the organization
operates. Whilst we believe that doing so requires the use of both cultural theories and institu-
tional theories, and we concentrate on the latter, since we believe that the latter can to some
extent encompass culture (“soft institutions”), that measures of national culture remain
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inconsistent (Avloniti and Filippaios 2014) and that organizations have limited ability to “work
around” institutional constraints compared to cultural ones (Vaiman and Brewster 2015). We
use research publications that utilize the Cranet data to show how that can be done. From that
evidence, we develop a series of proposals for further context-based research in HRM.
Because this is a review article, rather than a report on a specific research project, its for-
mat is a little unusual. First, we clarify what we mean by HRM and briefly develop a critique
of the extant research as largely ignoring the importance of context. We then consider com-
parative institutionalism as a theory of context. Thereafter, we present evidence drawn from
the Cranet network exploring and explaining differences in HRM in Europe to show how sig-
nificant context is for HRM practices and outcomes. In the penultimate section, we review
Cranet evidence that there is no significant convergence of national systems of HRM practi-
ces, suggesting that context remains a potent explanatory factor over time. Finally, we draw
on the first two sections of the article to suggest a series of propositions for future research.
The Cranfield Network on International Human Resource Management (IHRM) (Cranet),
was established to meet the need for ready access to information on best practice and com-
parative performance within Europe and, now, globally. Cranet is now an established
research collaboration between over 40 universities and business schools with a proven track
record of collecting powerful, representative data, on a continuing basis; undertaking rigorous
analysis and disseminating high quality results.
THEORIES OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (HRM)
According to Schuler and Jackson (2005), the study of HRM started in the United States in
the mid-1970s as a response to the increasing professionalization of HRM by HRM special-
ists, and a growing recognition of the importance of human resources to companies’ success.
As a consequence, businesses in the United States began to view human resource professio-
nals as partners “who should be involved in the strategic decision making processes of the
firm” (Schuler and Jackson 2005,12). The subject was encapsulated in two “founding” texts
that appeared at the same time in the early 1980s (Kaufman 2015). These offered approaches
developed in two of the leading University Management Schools in the United States: one by
Beer et al. (1984), offering the “Harvard model,” and one by Fombrun, Tichy, and Devanna
(1984) offering the “Chicago model” of HRM. The “Harvard” map of the territory of HRM,
as they termed it, took a wider perspective, giving a prominent role to stakeholder interests,
long-term consequences, and “situational factors.” Situational factors, or what we call con-
text, were not a feature of the Fombrun et al. (1984) text. Instead, it was significantly tightly
concentrated on the HRM chain within the firm as a means to promoting performance, and
was prescriptive, recommending systematic use of strategically based selection, individual
performance appraisal, individual performance-related rewards, and outcomes-monitored
training and development. The approach is unitarist, in the sense that employers and employ-
ees are not viewed as having conflicting or divergent interests (Walton 1985) and other stake-
holders’ interests are not relevant, so firms are, or should be, able to develop their HRM
practices free of industrial relations or governmental pressures. As Sparrow and Hiltrop
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(1994, 7) phrased it, in terms of this HRM paradigm, human resources are “to be obtained
cheaply, used sparingly, and developed and exploited as fully as possible in accordance with
the demands determined by the overall business strategy.”
The notion of HRM quickly spread to Europe and then around the world. One reason for
that was the lack of construct clarity around the phrase so that researchers with different
approaches could all cheerfully claim to be discussing HRM. Whist this led to a number of
critiques in the UK press in particular (Guest 1990; Legge 1995), in practice the Fombrun
et al. approach to HRM rapidly became the dominant paradigm. Purely in terms of citations,
the most cited HRM journal articles deal with the impact of elements of the HRM chain on
organizational performance. However, of greater significance to our argument is that the
focus is on firms within single national contexts, overwhelmingly that of the United States.
As such, context has not been considered to matter. Whilst, as we note below, since these
early days there have been calls for context to be taken into account in our explanations of
HRM policy and practice, and there has been some research that does that, the role of con-
text, and particularly nation context, remains a minority concern amongst HRM researchers.
As a range of complaints have made clear (Rynes, Brown, and Colbert 2002; Rynes, Giluk,
and Brown 2007), this lack of context is one reason why practitioners are not “listening” to
the researchers. The dominant strand of HRM ignores the everyday experience of practi-
tioners who are always conscious of context and the need to satisfy a complex range of
internal and external stakeholders whose interests are not necessarily compatible.
Context
More recently it has been recognized in HRM, and specifically in IHRM (see, e.g.,
Delbridge, Hauptmeier, and Sengupta 2011), that a weakness in much of the extant
“strategic” literature is that it rests on a fundamental assumption that managements can
choose and implement any strategy that they deem appropriate (Wangrow, Schepker, and
Barker 2015), and further, that the strategies they implement will have direct and intended
consequences regardless of context.
The HRM research that is most likely to overcome these weaknesses views management
action as nested within enabling and constraining forces, so that management can maneuver
only within relatively tight, externally located limits. Hence, a simplistic focus on the HRM
chain of policies, practices, and perceptions (Wright and Nishii 2013) and the corporate
strategy or policies of the firm misses important factors. Organization operates in context.
As Beer et al. (1984) noted, context includes external stakeholders, such as economic
actors, governments, local authorities, and trade unions, and background factors, such as the
size and economic power of the country, its history, and the levels of economic develop-
ment, and the rule of law interact to set the framework within which the organization oper-
ates. These all impact the HRM chain within the organization, and the outcomes of that
chain are located at different levels of social complexity: outcomes for the individual
employee; for organizational HRM; for organizational results; for the community; and
the country.
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Comparative Theories
In this article, we address comparative HRM and the level of context that occurs at, and
above, national level. We accept that factors, such as the size of the organization and the sec-
tor in which it operates are important, and we do not deny the importance of the organiza-
tion’s competitive situation, but our interest is in context at the national level and above.
Conceptualizing context requires defining a theoretical angle. The descriptive use of “obvious
surface phenomena,” such as size, sector, unemployment rates, or quality of the educational
system, is important but has its limits. Unless we define what these elements represent in the-
oretical terms, understanding their importance for HRM is difficult. There are two basic sets
of theories that have been used to explain differences in management generally and HRM in
particular at this level (Brewster and Mayrhofer 2012), namely, cultural theories and institu-
tional theories. Both are important to get a full picture of HRM, and we note some examples
of the culturally based literature below. Our main attention, though, is given to institutional
theories, since we believe that in many cases managements can “navigate around” cultural
differences, since they can, for example, recruit people who do not fit the local cultural ster-
eotypes into a subsidiary, but they have much less autonomy with regard to institutions, such
as the law or fiscal regulations, where they are constrained to either obey the rules or risk
severe penalties (Vaiman and Brewster 2015). Hoffmann (1999, 351) states that, “[i]nstitu-
tional theory directs attention toward forces that lie beyond the organizational boundary, in
the realm of social processes (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Scott 1995)”. A firm’s action is
seen not as a choice among an unlimited array of possibilities determined by purely internal
arrangements, but rather as a choice among a narrowly defined set of legitimate options
determined by the group of actors composing the firm's organizational field (Scott 1991).
The form of this influence is manifested in institutions: rules, norms, and beliefs that describe
reality for the organization, explaining what is and what is not, what can be acted upon and
what cannot. The field of comparative (neo-)institutionalism argues that to be effective,
organizations must establish and maintain legitimacy, and notes that this is construed differ-
ently in different national settings.
There have been approaches that focus on single institutional elements, and these have
been used by Cranet authors, as we note below. Thus, analysts have attempted to link intra-
organizational behavior with national politics (Roe 2003), political systems (Pagano and
Volpin 2005), or legislation (Botero et al. 2004). Botero et al. (2004), for example, focus on
the role labor regulation plays in determining management practices, and Botero et al. (2004,
1339) contend that “every country in the world has established a complex system of laws
and institutions intended to protect the interests of workers.” Further, they argue that systems
of labor regulation constitute formal institutions that constrain the actions of firms, their man-
agers, and employees through rewarding or sanctioning particular courses of behavior. The
most promising and to date widely used approach in HRM are the synthetic theories devel-
oped to include these and other national factors in explaining the differences between coun-
tries. Collectively, these are known as theories of comparative capitalisms (Jackson and
Deeg 2008).
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Comparative capitalisms encompass theories of Varieties of Capitalism (Hall and Soskice
2001; Thelen 2014), which draw a distinction between the Liberal Market Economies
(LMEs) of the English-speaking world and the Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) of,
mainly, the Rhineland countries. LMEs are “shareholder economies,” where competition is
key, and is legislatively required, and in which private enterprise is about maximizing short-
term profits for the owners of the business. Government’s role is to “hold the field” but
otherwise not interfere with business. In the CMEs there is more coordination through rela-
tional contracting, coordination, and mutual monitoring through networks. Firms collaborate
with each other and with government and pay attention to a wider set of stakeholders. These
differences apply within the firm too. In LMEs, managements and unions compete, while in
CMEs they are more likely to collaborate, reinforced by legislation on employee rights and
by financial arrangements that are less reliant on open capital markets. Other authors under
the comparative capitalisms rubric have given their theories different titles and identified dif-
ferent categories (Amable 2003; Whitley 1999) but are similarly focused on explaining firm
actions through the context in which they operate.
In firms operating in the CME context, managements are significantly more institutionally
constrained than those in the LME context, in the sense that they operate within legal frame-
works and systems of industrial relations that limit their autonomy in applying market-driven
or technologically contingent management practices. Hall and Soskice (2001) point to a num-
ber of systemic differences in HRM practices between firms operating in LMEs and CMEs.
Thus, whereas in LMEs there are substantial pay differentials, even within the same indus-
tries, in CMEs most pay negotiation occurs at the industry level, taking pay negotiation out
of the workplace. Likewise, whereas in LMEs the opportunities for employee dismissal for
economic reasons are relatively unconstrained, in CMEs there is a tradition of long-term
labor contracts and substantially greater security against arbitrary lay-offs.
Hall and Soskice (2001) recognize that there are a large number of countries that fall out-
side of their analysis. Both Amable (2003) and Whitley (1999), amongst others, cover a
wider range of countries and have more to say about relationships within the organization
than Hall and Soskice. Common to all of these approaches is that certain institutional con-
texts provide managers with greater autonomy than others. Using studies employing com-
parative institutional theory and data from Cranet surveys, we shall show how context
constitutes a powerful explanation of the use of HRM practices and outcomes. The Cranet
survey was developed in order to test not only elements of the Chicago model (e.g., perform-
ance-related compensation) but also the Harvard model (e.g., employee voice).
While some Cranet studies have included the effects of national culture (e.g., Nikandrou
et al. 2008), the overall theoretical thrust of Cranet research has been located within com-
parative institutional theory. Thus, there have been Cranet studies using varieties of capital-
ism (Hall and Soskice 2001; Thelen 2014) and business systems (Amable 2003; Whitley
1999) amongst others. Perhaps the most comprehensive test of such theories has been applied
by Walker, Brewster, and Wood (2014). Using internal firm-level evidence that market
economies (largely on the Amable models) are distinctive in terms of HRM, they find con-
siderable diversity within them but significantly that there are more differences between the
varieties than there are within them.
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THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT?
First, however, we address the question of whether analyses based on national context remain
important. The thrust of the arguments that globalization increasingly affects every aspect of
business (Drori, Meyer, and Hwang 2006; Gospel and Pendleton 2005) is that HRM may
become increasingly standardized to a dominant, efficient model of “best practice.” In brief,
the convergence thesis argues that differences in management systems, which have arisen as
a result of the geographical isolation of businesses, and the consequent development of dif-
fering beliefs and value orientations of national cultures, are being superseded by the logic of
technology and markets that requires the adoption of specific, and, therefore, universally
applicable, management techniques (Kidger 1991).
In direct contrast, proponents of the divergence thesis argue that personnel management
systems, far from being economically or technologically derived, epitomize national contexts
that do not respond readily to the imperatives of technology or the market. According to this
perspective, organizational choice is limited by culture and by institutional pressures, includ-
ing the state, regulatory structures, interest groups, public opinion, and norms (DiMaggio and
Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1983; Oliver 1991). Moreover, many of these pressures are
so accepted, so taken-for-granted “as to be invisible to the actors they influence” (Oliver
1991, 148). Alternatively, it has been argued that the embeddedness of HRM means that it is
likely to remain distinct in each country (Brewster and Mayrhofer 2012; Meyer, Mudambi,
and Narula 2011).
While many researchers have been constrained by having to grapple with the conver-
gence-divergence issue on the basis of sequential country-by-country descriptions, and with-
out the benefit of access to strictly comparable measures, Cranet researchers have been able
to simultaneously analyze developments across a range of countries in terms of precisely
defined HRM practices. Gooderham and Brewster (2003) found evidence of convergence
towards the “Americanization” of HRM, though they also noted significant differences
between the countries. HRM convergence was explored in detail by Mayrhofer et al. (2011),
who looked at the position in Europe over two decades. They found evidence of some clear
trends in HRM, in, for example, increasing individualization of HRM, and increased commu-
nication within organizations, in a steady rise in contingent pay systems and a centralization
of policy-making towards the HRM department and away from line management. They found
no evidence of country “recipes” losing their force or countries becoming more alike in
their HRM.
In detail, Cranet researchers find that, for example, union membership, employers’ recog-
nition of unions, policy determination in industrial relations, and communications between
management and employees, showed similar trends, but across-Europe distinctive national
patterns of industrial relations remained steady (Gunnigle, Brewster, and Morley 1994;
Morley et al. 1996). Similarly, later research (Brewster et al. 2007) also largely rejected the
notion that there has been a development from collective towards individual voice mecha-
nisms. It was concluded that collective voice still remains significant in large work
organizations.
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Larsen and Brewster (2003), examining the decentralization or delegation of HRM respon-
sibilities to the line management over a ten-year period, found that the positions of the coun-
tries they examined, relative to one another, did not change. In that sense, they observed no
significant convergence.
Nikandrou, Apospori, and Papalexandris (2005) longitudinally examined HRM strategies
and practices and the role of HRM within organizations in 18 European countries. Adopting
a country-level analysis, they employed cluster analysis to group the countries at both points
in time. Two stable major clusters were identified, indicating a systematic North/
West–South/East distinction in respect to HRM practices. No signs of convergence between
these two clusters were found. However, it was observed that Italy and the former East
Germany had moved closer to the North-Western cluster.
Clearly, the findings on convergence from the above studies are complex but largely nega-
tive. In that sense, the Cranet research has indicated that what North (1990) refers to as the
“rules of the game” are not undergoing dramatic change. This is despite the presence of for-
eign MNCs in Europe that are sources of local variety, but in fact, largely follow local laws
and regulations (Brewster, Wood, and Brookes 2008; Farndale, Poutsma, and Brewster
2008), and despite the latitude that firms have to make strategic decisions.
EVIDENCE FROM CRANET
We offer our account of the findings from Cranet-based research in line with the human
resource cycle that applies to employees: covering successively the strategic role of the
HRM department and, then, policies that are experienced by employees. We then cover, in
turn, recruitment and selection, voice and communication, compensation, training, and ten-
ure. We discuss briefly the Cranet research that has addressed the business outcomes of
HRM: productivity and financial performance.
The Strategic Role of the HRM Department in HRM Practices
Looking at the voice and strategy debate from another angle, and using a wider range of
countries, Vernon and Brewster (2013) found that in organizations where trade union mem-
bership and influence are high, the HRM department is better positioned to play a strategic
role. Brewster, Brookes, and Gollan (2015) examined the role of line managers in 11 coun-
tries. Organizations in the Nordic economies were most likely to assign HRM responsibilities
to the line and LMEs least likely to do so. They also noted that in any economy the least
likely to assign HRM responsibilities to the line were larger organizations, unionized organi-
zations, and those with the most strategically positioned HRM departments.
Employing a multi-level analysis, Gooderham et al. (2015) examine the impact of firm
and national level characteristics on the location of the primary responsibility for HRM deci-
sion-making concerning the following four HRM areas: pay and benefits; recruitment and
selection; training and development; and industrial relations. At the national level, they
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employ Botero et al. (2004) in order to test whether institutional conditions influence the
location of HRM decision making. They find support for the notion that, the greater the
degree to which the conditions of employment are specified legally, the fewer incentives
firms have to develop a specialized HRM function that has decision-making responsibility.
Thus, in institutional settings characterized by more rigid employment laws, devolution to
line management is greater. This remains the case even when controlling for national culture.
However, their multi-level analysis also indicates that firms have a significant degree of lati-
tude to engage in strategic behaviors irrespective of institutional constraints. Thus, they find
that the political power of senior HR managers has a unique effect on the ownership of
HRM decision-making.
Recruitment and selection
There have been few attempts to use the Cranet data to examine recruitment and perform-
ance, and the reason for that may be that the findings are equivocal—pointing to neither uni-
formity nor diffuse diversity. They show that whilst there are distinctions according to types
of comparative capitalisms and the property rights implied under each type, the patterns
show as many examples of diversity within a system as between them (Wood et al. 2014).
This seems to be an area where context is perhaps less important than managerial agency.
Employer-employee communication
Voice is one of the topics where the comparative capitalisms literature is clearest. It is
expected that employees will have least voice in the owner-focused LMEs and more in the
stakeholder-focused CMEs. There is now considerable evidence that these predictions are
broadly correct (Brewster et al. 2007; Brewster et al. 2014; Brewster, Wood, and Goergen
2015). Brewster et al. (2014) found that, although the picture was complex, both direct and
indirect participation varied with setting, being much more likely to occur in CMEs.
Aside from the impact on the firm, the Cranet data have also addressed the debate as to
whether other forms of voice “crowd out” formal trade union voice, being used perhaps as a
way for management to avoid or bypass the unions. Brewster et al. (2007) found that, in fact,
the two systems are much more likely to complement each other than to be substitutes.
Croucher, Gooderham, and Parry (2006) argue that the “Varieties of Capitalism” literature
suggests that, as part of a general structural bias towards consensus-building, in particular
within organizations (Hall and Soskice 2001), stronger information-sharing is to be expected
in CMEs than in LMEs. They examined this thesis by comparing the use of “direct
communication,” i.e., management information-giving to employees that is not mediated
through employee representatives, in the UK, an LME country, and Denmark, a CME coun-
try. However, they found no support for national level differences. Instead, they found that
despite the marked systemic differences between the two national cases, direct communica-
tion has similar antecedents in both countries. In both the UK and Denmark, firms involving
their HR managers in strategy development are significantly more likely to have direct com-
munication than those that do not. This finding holds true even when the level of
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unionization at the firm-level is controlled for. Thus, independent of the unionization factor,
a strategic approach to HRM, denoted by the integration of the HRM function into the strat-
egy formulation process, is associated with high levels of direct communication
with employees.
Compensation
One early application of comparative institutional theory to compensation is the study of
Gooderham, Nordhaug, and Ringdal (1999). After developing a two-fold typology of HRM
practices, that distinguished “calculative” and “collaborative” HRM, they categorized six
European institutional contexts that they employed to hypothesize differences in the applica-
tion HRM. While the concept of collaborative HRM captures how employers brief employees
on strategy, the concept of calculative HRM encapsulates individualized pay-for-performance
(I-PFP) compensation systems. Their findings are particularly clear-cut for the latter. They
find that calculative HRM is much more of a feature of the UK than of Germany or
Scandinavia. Thus, their findings support the notion that institutional determinants, as indi-
cated by the national embeddedness of firms, have a substantial effect on the application of
compensation practices. In a substantial refinement of this analysis, Gooderham et al. (2018)
conducted a multi-level analysis of the adoption of I-PFP using data from over 4,000 firms
in 26 countries. Using Botero et al.’s (2004) labor regulation approach to conducting cross-
national institutional comparisons, as well as a measure of national culture, they find that, at
the country level, both culture and the institutional environment explain significant variance
in the use of I-PFP. Thus, although they find a high degree of inter-firm variability within
countries, country level effects have an important impact on firm behavior. Further, their
study indicates that a country’s institutions explain unique variance over and above the effect
of culture on the use of I-PFP. Moreover, while culture plays some role in determining I-PFP
use, this role is entirely mediated via institutional configuration (labor regulation and
between-country differences) in the influence of labor unions. As such, their study supports
the general approach of Cranet research to focus on comparative institutional theory rather
than on culture theory.
Gooderham et al.’s (2015) study also indicates that regardless of country-of-origin, for-
eign-owned firms, in general, show greater propensity to adopt I-PFP than do domestic firms.
Thus, multi-national firms do not necessarily seek to impose home country practices but
seem to converge towards a global standard. These findings are in line with the Le et al.
(2013) study, which shows that use of management incentives is higher in MNCs than in
domestic firms and that the gap between MNCs and domestic firms is lower in the MNCs
than in other types of market economy.
Cranet scholars have also studied financial participation, including share schemes and
profit sharing. One of the world’s leading experts on financial participation, Erik Poutsma,
with colleagues (Poutsma, Ligthart, and Schouteten 2005), found that what they called
“Anglo-Saxonization” had a significant effect on the likelihood of share schemes and profit
sharing, both those aimed just at management and the broad-based schemes, and that this
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applied both to the LME economies and to the influence of U.S. MNEs within European
economies. Kalmi, Pendleton, and Poutsma (2012) used the Cranet data to explore financial
participation, and variable pay, in 13 European countries, and found a complex picture. They
found that team-based variable pay is most common in centralized pay regimes, and
employee share ownership most common in decentralized regimes. Their decentralized
regimes are mostly LMEs and the centralized ones CMEs, but this is not consistently the
case. Kabst, Matiaske, and Schmelter (2006, 577) examined the UK, France, and Germany
and similarly found that “the institutional environment in which the organization is situated
affects the occurrence and eligibility of financial participations schemes.” Croucher et al.
(2010) had similar findings, noting also that collective employee voice (see below) had no
impact, but that calculative HRM strategies were significant. In line with Gooderham et al.
(2015), Poutsma, Ligthart, and Schouteten (2005) too observe considerable diversity at the
within-country level.
Training
Training is more likely to occur in CMEs, according to the literature on comparative capital-
isms. With lower turnover, less downsizing, and longer tenure, firms are more likely to invest
in developing their employees; those trained employees are more likely to stay with the
organization rather than take that investment to competitors. In fact, although these categori-
zations are broadly correct, and analyses by organizational size or sector had little explana-
tory power, the Cranet data shows a need for a more nuanced picture, with significant
variation within the CME group (Goergen et al. 2012).
Tenure
Tenure will be longer in the CMEs than in the more transactional LMEs. In LMEs, the
opportunities for employee dismissal for economic reasons are relatively unconstrained,
whilst in CMEs there is a tradition of long-term labor contracts and substantially greater
security against arbitrary lay-offs. This was tested by Croucher et al. (2012). They used
Amable’s (2003) more differentiated view of distinctions within the CME group, separating
out the Nordic group, and found that exit, forced or voluntary, is more common in the LME
countries and least common in the CMEs, with the Nordic group somewhere between the
two. Similarly, Goergen, Brewster, and Wood (2013) found that downsizing was not
explained by differences in varieties of capitalism, nor by legal origins, but was correlated
with differences in political systems, being less common in those countries with proportional
representation.
Looking across these findings, it seems that some HRM practices, such as representative
employee voice, compensation and tenure are more impacted by context than others, where
managements may have greater agency.
HRM outcomes. What about the outcomes of HRM policies and practices? A substantial
proportion of the most highly cited empirical studies of HRM have as their primary focus the
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relationship between HRM and organizational performance, not least productivity and finan-
cial performance (Jackson, Schuler, and Jiang 2014). Cranet research contains several exam-
ples of this relationship but differs by studying financial performance outcomes across a
variety of contexts, not least national context.
Productivity and financial performance
A driving force behind the emergence of the narrow strategic view of HRM was the belief
that HRM practices should serve the owners of the business and enhance organizational per-
formance, not least in a short-term financial sense (Schuler and Jackson 2005). Paralleling
this, numerous theorists have argued that the human resources of the firm are potentially a
powerful source of sustainable competitive advantage, and have sought to demonstrate that
there is a positive relationship between HRM and firm performance (Appelbaum, Berg, and
Kalleberg 2000; Guest 1997; Huselid 1995; Paauwe, Guest, and Wright 2013).
Stavrou-Costea (2005) studied HRM challenges in southern EU countries and their effect
on organizational performance. On the basis of the existing literature, she identified a number
of basic challenges that involved training and development, efficiency and flexibility, and
employee relations. She found that these were related to firm productivity in most of south-
ern EU.
Apospori et al. (2008) also included southern Europe in their analysis of the firm-level
impact of strategic HRM practices on organizational performance. They clustered these coun-
tries and compared them to a cluster of northern European countries. Adopting a contingency
approach, they developed a structural model that considered direct and indirect influences of
market growth, business strategy formalization, and HRM centrality and practices on organ-
izational performance in Europe. Their study revealed differences between northern and
southern Europe. Clear differences appeared between the two clusters in the HRM policies
and practices correlated with higher performance, thus indicating that the link between HRM
and performance may be different in various geographies. Apospori et al. (2008, 1202) con-
cluded that “[t]reating various European countries together may disguise interesting differen-
ces; based on this assumption the present research studied the two major groups of countries
identified in cluster analysis. However, further division of the two clusters into sub-clusters
would give us more refined estimates of the found impacts and reveal some more interesting
differences.”
In other words, they indicate the need to include country, rather than clusters of countries,
in future analyses. This is precisely the strategy adopted by Gooderham, Parry, and Ringdal
(2008) and Rizov and Croucher (2008). Gooderham et al. (2008) examined the extent to
which HRM practices have a significant impact on whether gross revenue over the past three
years has been well in excess of costs or not. Deploying factor analysis on as many as
60 HRM practices contained in the Cranet data set, they identify six bundles of calculative
practices, six bundles of collaborative practices, and three “intermediary” bundles. Their find-
ings both support and cast some doubt on the value of HRM for firm performance in the con-
text of Europe in that their findings are different in regard to calculative and collaborative
HRM. While they found that calculative and intermediary HRM bundles, with exceptions,
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generally have some impact on the performance of European firms, collaborative HRM bun-
dles do not. They found no support for the notion that these HRM bundles would be contin-
gent on an interaction with a range of external and internal factors. They observed that, for
European firms, the country of location is a relatively important source of variation in per-
formance. This was ascribed to differences in national economic cycles, but they also specu-
lated that country of location may reflect the efficacy of national business systems in
delivering profits for owners. The authors argued that future studies should be designed to
differentiate between cyclical economic conditions and long-term institutional conditions.
Rizov and Croucher’s (2008) study of HRM and performance in Europe also adopts the
calculative/collaborative HRM dichotomy. However, unlike Gooderham et al., who differen-
tiated between various bundles of calculative and collaborative HRM, Rizov and Croucher
used only two composite HRM measures. Another difference is that Rizov and Croucher’s
measure of self-reported measure of firm performance is significantly broader, being a com-
posite index comprised of five partial measures: service quality, level of productivity, profit-
ability, product to market time, and rate of innovation. However, despite these differences,
when Rizov and Croucher tested the relationship between HRM practices and firm perform-
ance, they also found, like Gooderham et al. (2008), that while calculative HRM has a posi-
tive impact on performance, collaborative HRM has no effect.
Rizov and Croucher then inter-acted the two HRM variables with country dummies. This
had noticeable consequences. First, while the effect of collaborative HRM on performance
remained non-significant, the effect of calculative HRM was now also non-significant.
Overall, their analysis indicated virtually no significant country-calculative HRM interaction
effects on performance. Instead, their analysis indicated positive interaction effects of collab-
orative practices for several CME countries including France, Germany, and Denmark,
though no such effects for several other CME countries such as Belgium, Austria, and
Norway. This assortment of findings was also the case when Rizov and Croucher tested for
absenteeism and employee turnover rather than performance. Nevertheless, they concluded
that the evidence suggests that collaborative HRM is more likely than calculative HRM to
enhance firm performance when one takes into account the institutional setting. In short,
firms located in high trust CME countries are more conducive to generating performance
effects from collaborative HRM than LME countries such as the UK. On this basis, Rizov
and Croucher (2008:18) argued that their findings “demonstrate that the CME model is
superior in supporting productive efficiency at the organizational level.”
Taken together, and allowing for differences in operationalizations of firm performance,
these studies indicate that the effect of HRM on firm performance is somewhat limited. This
is particularly the case when firm performance is defined in terms of purely financial per-
formance. Furthermore, both studies indicate that country of location is a factor that influen-
ces firm performance. Whereas Rizov and Croucher ascribe this to institutional setting and,
thus, argue for the superiority of the CME institutional setting, Gooderham et al. (2008) point
to an alternative possibility, that of variation in national economic cycles. This would account
for the variation Rizov and Croucher observed between CME countries in relation to collab-
orative HRM. However, Gooderham et al. also speculate that country of location may reflect
the efficacy of national business systems.
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PROPOSALS
We have argued that HRM research needs to take more account of context, perhaps particu-
larly using the neo-institutional lens. Moreover, these differences are not going away: there
is little sign of convergence. We have also shown that the researchers in the Cranet network
have made a significant contribution already to that research drive. Where do the theories
and the evidence take us for the immediate future? Each of the areas studied so far by the
network leaves considerable room for development. A weakness of the Cranet data is that it
can show differences in terms of numbers and percentage but not in terms of quality. Thus,
we can measure the number of organizations using particular recruitment patterns or dealing
with trade unions, but we cannot tell from this evidence how well they do that. There is a
need for more detailed comparative research on all these topics.
We close this article by suggesting four areas of potential research that might be said to
arise directly from the evidence we have outlined. These are as follows: expanding the
research beyond Europe; clarifying the role of managerial autonomy; the role of MNEs in
bringing in new HRM practices; the impact of time, in particular the effects of factors such
as economic crisis on a country’s HRM practices years later and the extent of convergence
or divergence.
Expanding the research beyond Europe is obviously needed given the Euro-centric nature
of the research noted. It is becoming more of a possibility as Cranet collects solid data from
North and South America and Asia. Although it is the focus of this issue, Cranet, of course,
is not the only source of comparable data on HRM, and we look forward to other evidence
being developed. There are ever greater numbers of qualified researchers from almost every
country in the world, and the research into emerging countries and their multinational corpo-
rations is growing apace and showing the importance of context and of not assuming that
things will work the same way in different contexts.
Clarifying the role of managerial autonomy is, in a sense, a counter-balance to the insist-
ence of the neo-institutional literature that managers are not free to do as they wish but rather
are tightly constrained in their actions-–at least, if they wish to be legitimate and effective. In
fact, literature shows that there is room for managerial agency: We just do not know how
much room. To what extent can managers act outside the cultural and institutional norms and
still be effective? In some contexts, institutions may be weak and not be deeply embedded in
the fabric of the country. For example, in some developing counties the power of certain
families, tradition, and/or corruption may be more powerful than government enforcement.
We need more research that examines the role of managerial agency and the balance between
that and the institutional constraint.
The role of MNEs follows a similar line of argument. How much freedom do they have to
act differently from other organizations in the host countries? There has been much debate,
and there is still much to learn. The Cranet evidence (Brewster, Wood, and Brookes 2008;
Farndale, Poutsma, and Brewster 2008; Fenton-O’Creevy, Gooderham, and Nordhaug 2008;
Gooderham, Nordhaug, and Ringdal 2006), unlike many other contributions, is able to com-
pare MNEs and indigenous firms directly, and that evidence seems to show that MNEs are
different from indigenous firms, but not that different. Basically, they have to deal with the
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same education system, labor market, and employment and fiscal laws as all other organiza-
tions. In the LMEs, multinational firms follow LME practices; in CMEs they are more likely
to follow CME practices. But they are innovators in each society, and they do some things
differently; we need greater understanding of what these things are, what enables and con-
strains them, and how these might be explained.
The impact of time has been largely ignored in HRM research (Hippler, Brewster, and
Haslberger 2015; Sonnentag 2012) but is clearly critical. The discussion of convergence
above is a case in point. Unless we can measure changes in HRM over time, and ensure that
we are comparing data collected at the same time point, we will not be able to understand
the impact of context fully when we do international comparisons. There is an urgent need
for more longitudinal analyses.
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